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1 |  INTRODUCTION
In their seminal work, Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) make the observation that total profits 
of firms are likely to be higher when they act as individual profit-maximizers than when they choose 
their actions jointly as part of a cooperation agreement. This led to the coining of the term merger 
paradox to describe this fundamental insight in the setting of Cournot competition in a single market.
There are numerous implications of this fundamental insight for the sustainability of informal 
(cartel) and formal (merger) agreements among firms in a single market. In essence, the paradox 
seeks an answer to the question why firms agree to cooperate when they are better-off acting on their 
own. Various authors have since investigated how this result depends on the modelling assumptions 
concerning the functional form of demand and production cost. With sufficiently convex costs, e.g. 
Perry and Porter (1985) and Amir and Stepanova (2009) show that the merger paradox disappears.
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We investigate the stability of cooperation agreements, 
such as those agreed by cartels, among firms in a Cournot 
model of oligopolistic competition embedded in a multima-
rket contact setting. Our analysis considers a broad array 
of 64 potential market structural configurations under lin-
ear demand and quadratic production costs. We establish 
that for an appropriate range of parameter values there ex-
ists a unique core stable market configuration in which an 
identical two-firm cartel is sustained in both markets. Our 
result highlights the significance of multimarket presence 
for cartel formation in light of the well-known result from 
the single-market setting where cartels are non-profitable.
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Other authors have demonstrated the sensitivity of the result on the precise order or sequencing 
of decisions and the presence of outside competitive pressure. Following an approach pioneered by 
d’Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszewicz, and Weymark (1983) for example, Shaffer (1995), Konishi and 
Lin (1999) and Zu, Zhang, and Wang (2012) demonstrate the existence of a stable cartel where the 
cartel is a Stackelberg quantity leader and all non-member firms of the cartel are Cournot competitive 
with respect to the residual demand.
Instead, we focus on environments in which firms operate on multiple, strongly related markets—
denoted as multimarket oligopolies. In these multimarket oligopolies, we investigate the endogenous 
composition and location of cartel structures. The setting of multiple markets on which these firms 
operate can be interpreted as their presence at multiple geographical locations or as representing 
the separation between different media through which trade is conducted. The latter might refer to a 
traditional sales technology through stores versus virtual sales through online web stores. We make 
a contribution to this literature by demonstrating that stable agreements are sustained in a standard 
Cournot oligopoly if firms operate on multiple (strongly related) markets and that these agreements 
involve a strict subset of firms operating on those markets.
For this insight, we do not rely on the agreeing cartel coalition having a quantity-setting leadership 
position. We apply convex production costs, creating both strategic substitutes and diseconomies of 
scope across both markets—using the terminology of Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985).1 
Our model is therefore related to that of Zhang and Zhang (1996). These authors provide conditions 
for the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium in multimarket environments. However, they do not 
consider the possibility of cooperative agreements among market participants. Such cartel formation 
is instead the focus of our work.
A key element in any analysis of cartel formation is what constitutes a sustainable cooperation 
agreement leading to a stable cartel. For this purpose, we choose to employ the notion of core stability 
as it best captures the range of deviation possibilities of the firms—unilaterally or as a group; and the 
concept of self-enforcing, binding agreements. A core stable configuration is one in which there are 
no incentives for any group of firms to deviate, either by forming an alternative cartel or individually. 
We build our notion on the premise that the deviating firms would expect the non-deviating firms 
to maintain the status-quo, i.e. by definition the non-deviating firms are assumed to be passive and, 
therefore, the market structures involving non-deviating players are not expected to change.
1.1 | Related literature
Belleflamme and Bloch (2008) study conditions for sustainable cooperation between two firms in 
a symmetric two-market setting. Our work differs from theirs in that we allow for cartel formation 
among three firms in possibly asymmetric markets, i.e. cartels may be formed by fewer than all mar-
ket participants and the two markets may differ in size. This allows us to provide further insights on 
the degree of cooperation and the location of the cartel based on the relative market size.
While multimarket oligopolies have been used to analyse corporate espionage (Billand, Bravard, 
Chakrabarti, & Sarangi, 2016) and taxation (Lapan and Hennessy, 2011), we believe we are the first 
to examine cartel stability in multi-market oligopolies.
 1Assuming linear costs in a multimarket environment does not add to the analysis of cartel stability since there are no 
linkages across markets, so the multimarket oligopoly is simply the original single-market oligopoly replicated twice 
independently.
   | 3CHAKRABARTI eT Al.
We note here that our underlying cartel formation game is akin to a partition function form game—a 
model that has been studied in cooperative game theory. In a partition function form game—as in our 
cartel formation setup—the value a coalition of players can generate in cooperation depends on the 
structure of cooperative agreements among the players outside of this coalition. Our multimarket car-
tel formation model, however, is more general than a partition function form game as players operate 
on multiple distinctive market settings: each firm may be part of multiple agreements—one on each 
market; the structures of cooperative agreements on each market may differ; and all market structures 
affect the payoffs of all cartels and all individual firms.
Concerning the fundamental notion of core stability as pursued here, we note that this notion origi-
nates in the theory of cooperative games in partition function form, seminally, by Chander and Tulkens 
(1997). More recently, Abe and Funaki (2017) examine the optimistic and pessimistic core of such 
games. In the pessimistic core, the deviating coalition assumes the worst reaction from the remaining 
non-deviating players. In the optimistic core, it assumes the best reaction from the non-deviating play-
ers. They also consider notions of the core where the non-deviating players are expected to dissolve 
their coalitions into singletons or form the largest possible coalition. This approach is not directly 
applicable to our setup, however, as in our model profits among cartel members are non-transferable.
As an alternative approach to the one we have taken—build on a standard cooperative game theo-
retic concept—one could consider a non-cooperative game theoretic approach to coalition formation. 
We mention a few papers that have taken this approach. A comprehensive review of this literature is 
available in Yi (2003).
Bloch (1996) puts forward the following non-cooperative procedure. Based on an exogenous order, 
players propose coalitions which other coalition members can accept or reject. The first player to re-
ject the offer makes a counter-offer in the next period and so forth. If all players agree, the coalition 
is formed and the coalition is not allowed to subsequently break-up or accept new members, and the 
remaining players continue the coalition formation process. Bloch (1997, 2002) shows that the equi-
librium coalition structure corresponds to the equilibrium of a certain size announcement game and 
involves a no-delay equilibrium in which all proposals are accepted. In the homogeneous Cournot 
model, this procedure results in the formation of a single cartel.
Yi and Shin (2000) and Bloch (2002) consider a different procedure where players simultaneously 
decide whether or not to join the coalition: Each player announces an address simultaneously, and 
players with the same address belong to the same coalition.
Ray and Vohra (1997) analyse a coalition formation game in which coalitions can only break up 
into smaller sub-coalitions. They define stable coalition structures as follows: A degenerate coalition 
structure in which all coalitions are singletons is stable by definition. A non-degenerate coalition 
structure is stable if no coalition has a sub-coalition—called a coalition of leading perpetrators—
whose members have incentives to initiate a break-up of the coalition structure. Players are far-sighted 
and foresee the final stable coalition structure that will form after further subsequent break-ups. The 
leading perpetrators will only initiate a break-up if they are better off in the final stable coalition 
structure.
Ray and Vohra (1999) define an extensive form bargaining game similar to Bloch (1996) that 
yields such a stable coalition structure in the subgame perfect stationary equilibrium. One difference 
with Bloch (1996) is that while in the latter, coalitional worth is divided according to a fixed rule, in 
the former, how the worth is divided is part of the bargaining process. In the homogeneous Cournot 
model, once again a unique cartel emerges.
The advantage of the approach we take compared over the non-cooperative game theoretic analy-
sis, is in its generality: Unlike non-cooperative concepts, the core is not tied to a specific procedure for 
the sharing of the coalitional value or pre-determined sequence of deviations.
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In addition, our analysis is built on the premises on non-transferability of payoffs. In this respect, 
our work is related to the literature on hedonic coalition formation games. These game theoretic mod-
els were introduced by Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002), further analysed by Banerjee, Konishi, and 
Sonmez (2001). In this setting, the players’ preferences are ordinal and they are defined over coalition 
memberships. Various notions of stability have been defined in this setting. Individual stability refers 
to the situation where no player wants to leave her coalition for another one (including the empty 
coalition). Nash stability is a stronger version of individual stability where players can join any new 
coalition without the permission of existing members. More demanding than these is core stability, 
where multiple players can deviate to form a new coalition. While in hedonic games, a player’s payoff 
depends only on the membership of her coalition, the approach can be extended to non-hedonic games 
where a player has a preference mapping over all possible partitions of the player set. Core stability 
can be extended to this setting which is what we are doing here.
1.2 | Structure of the paper
The next section presents the multimarket Cournot model and key concepts for its analysis. In Section 
3, we present the main results on core stable structures and discuss the role of convexity. Section 4 
contains a brief discussion of other assumptions and outlays paths for future work.
2 |  THE MODEL
We explore a setting where three firms are selling an identical product in multiple, separate markets. 
The firms are labelled a, b and c and we denote the set of firms by N = {a, b, c} with i being a generic 
firm in the set N. We let the set of markets be given by  = {M1, M2, … , Mm}, using the indicator 
k ∈ {1, …, m} to refer to market Mk ∈.
We assume that all firms in N are quantity-setters; that is in the absence of cooperation agreements 
these firms compete á la Cournot in quantities on all markets in . We denote by qik, the quantities 
sold by firm i in market Mk. Furthermore, we let pk stand for the market price emerging on market Mk.
We assume that competitors’ products are substitutes in all markets and there are diseconomies 
of scope across these markets. More specifically, markets are characterized by inverse linear demand 
functions specified for Mk as 
where 0 < 𝛼1 < 𝛼2 < ⋯ < 𝛼m are demand parameters capturing each market’s size, respectively. Hence, 
all markets are ordered in terms of their size, where market M1 is the smallest market and market Mm is 
the largest market.
We assume that firms produce under an identical quadratic cost function given by 
where qi =
(
qi1, qi2, … , qim
)
 is the output vector for firm i ∈ N.
pk = k −
∑
i∈N









   | 5CHAKRABARTI eT Al.
We remark that from the postulated linearity of the market demand, it follows that the total reve-
nues of a firm are simply the sum of the firm’s revenues in each market. In contrast, there is no such 
market separability in the postulated quadratic cost function. This implies that firm i’s total profit can 
be expressed as 
For this linear-quadratic formulation, the second-order conditions for a maximum are always satisfied if 
k’s are not too different.
2 Hence, one obtains a unique interior maximum through consideration of the 
first-order conditions.
2.1 | Cartel formation
We consider a general cooperation framework in which any subset of the postulated three firms may 
choose to form a cartel in any market. Thus, a cartel is any coalition of at least two firms in any one 
of the m markets in .
Note that in principle any given cartel operates in a single market, but we emphasize that the same 
group of firms may form a cartel in other markets as well.3 Equally, there may be distinct groups that 
form cartels on different markets. Thus, whereas each firm can be a member of only one cartel in a 
given market,4 the same firm may be a member of more than one cartel, each of which operates in a 
different market and has a distinct membership.
Such cartel formation is formalized as follows.
Definition 1 A market configuration is a listing of individual market structures  = ⟨1, … ,m⟩ 
where for each market Mk ∈, the structure k is a partition of N = {a, b, c} into distinct 
groups.
For every firm i ∈ N, we denote by i(k) the status of firm i in the structure k in market Mk given 
by the group i(k) = S∈k if i ∈ S .
A market structure imposes on each market a partitioning of all firms that describes the competitive 
structure in that particular market. For example, consider m = 2 and the following market structure: 
1 = { {a}, {b}, {c} }, i.e. pure competition in market M1; and 2 = { {a}, {b, c} }, i.e. partial cooper-
ation—a cartel between firms b and c in market M2. In this case we have firm a acting as singleton in 
both markets with a(1) = a(2) = {a}, whereas firms b and c have a different status in each market: 



























, otherwise all firms will produce zero output in market M
1
.
 3We re-visit our modelling strategy of a cartel as being bound to a single market in the discussion section.
 4Given that our analysis pertains to a set of three firms, the assumption implies that there is at most one cartel operating in a 
market.
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2.1.1 | Cartel objectives
The objective of a cartel operating on a specific market is in principle to maximize the joint profits 
of its members. Thus, members of the cartel commit to an agreed production level—output quotas— 
determined for this particular market, given their output levels in all other markets. Here, we assume 
that the standard Cournot competitive hypothesis applies: All members of a cartel operating in a cer-
tain market decide their production levels jointly in order to maximize their total joint profits subject 
to the production decision of every firm outside the cartel (if any) on this particular market and the 
decisions made by all firms in the other markets.
Throughout, we assume that monetary transfers among cartel members are not possible. In partic-
ular, we focus our analysis on symmetric equilibria, making this assumption innocuous. Indeed, all 
firms in our model face the same demand in each market and use the same production technology; 
thus, all cartel members earn equal profits in the market where the cartel operates. Hence, there is no 
scope for transfers.
We formalize the behaviour of cartels and individual firms as follows.
Assumption 1 Let ∅≠S⊂N = {a, b, c} be a group of firms in market Mk. Denote by qkS = (qik)i∈S 
the vector of output levels of group members in market Mk and by qk−S = (qjk)j∉S the vector of 
output levels of all firms outside S in market Mk.
Then the group S forms a cartel in market Mk by maximizing the group’s collective profit over the 
production decisions qk
S
, solving the optimization problem given by 
Consider a market configuration  = ⟨1, … ,m⟩. Then for every k ∈ {1, …, m} every S∈k is as-
sumed to determine its collective output levels by solving the objective problem stated in (2).
The immediate consequence of Assumption 1 is that every cartel or individual firm in a market config-
uration for market Mk acts to maximize its collective profits over the output levels in that particular market 
given the output decisions of all non-cartel members in market Mk and of all firms in all other markets.
Example 1 To illustrate the importance of the market configuration in deriving firms’ optimal deci-
sions in context of the decision objective (2), we consider again m = 2 markets M1 and M2 with 
market configuration  = ⟨ { {a},{b},{c} } , { {a}, {b, c} } ⟩. In market configuration Ω firm 
a acts competitively in both markets and, thus, firm a chooses its quantity vector (qa1, qa2) to 
maximize its total profits as given by: 
Like firm a, firms b and c choose their respective outputs on market M1 unilaterally. Thus, each firm 
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In market M2, instead, firms b and c choose their respective outputs (qb2 and qc2) jointly. Thus, they con-
sider their joint profit maximization problem: 
The optimization problems stated above form an exhaustive and proper description of all decision pro-
cesses in this particular configuration.
2.2 | Core stable market configurations
To determine the equilibrium number, size, composition, and location of cartels, we adopt the notion 
of core stability based on the equilibrium notion of the core to the specific cartel formation model we 
study here. Before we present a formal definition of our core stability concept, we introduce some 
auxiliary notions that are used to clarify possible deviations by firms.
Definition 2 Let  = ⟨1,2, … ,m⟩ be a market configuration.
Consider k  ∈  {1,  …,  m} and S⊂N. We say that the coalition S can transition from struc-
ture k to structure ̂k on market Mk if for all members i∈S : i(�𝜔k)⊆S and for all non-members 
j∉S : j(̂k) = j(k)⧵S.
When coalition S can transition from k to ̂k in market Mk, we denote this by k →S ̂k.
A coalition S can transition from one structure to another in a certain given market if its members 
can abandon existing groups that they are member of and form alternative cartels with other coalition 
members.
A market configuration Ω is now “core stable” if there is no coalition S in any market that has the 
ability as well as the proper incentives to transition to an alternative structure. This is formalized as 
follows.




 is core stable if there does not exist a coalition 






1. for every market Mk with ̂k ≠k, coalition S can transition to ̂k from k, i.e. k →S ̂k, 
and
2. i(̂)⩾i () for every i ∈ S and 𝜋j(�) > 𝜋j () for at least one j ∈ S.
Our core stability notion presumes that a deviating coalition S can form any arbitrary partition 
among its own members in any market. If, by doing so, it can make one of its members strictly better 
off and the other members no worse off, the original market configuration is not core stable.
3 |  IDENTIFICATION OF CORE STABLE CARTELS
To set up a benchmark for our multimarket analysis, we first present the result for core stable cartel 
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cartel formation under Cournot competition. Subsequently, we consider the case of two markets and 
show that a unique core stable configuration emerges in which cartels with the same membership form 
on each market.
3.1 | Core stability in one market
In the single market case with linear demand and quadratic cost functions, we show that there are no 
core stable market configurations. The merger paradox lies at the very foundation of this non-exist-
ence result, as firms find it profitable to transition away from a two-firm cartel.5 The required analysis 
considers three fundamental market structures:
1 = { {a}, {b}, {c} }: Our model reduces to a standard Cournot model of three firms where each 
firm i ∈ {a, b, c} maximizes its own profits taking as given the quantity chosen by the other two firms:6 
The reaction function of each firm i simplifies to: 
where we adopt the notation Q−i =
∑
j≠i qj. The solution to the system of three equations gives us the equi-
librium quantities qi =

5




2 = {N}: Next, we consider the case when all three firms form a single monopolistic cartel and 
agree on their output quotas. The joint maximization problem is formally given by: 
The optimal quantity profile is given by the solution of the following system of first-order conditions: 
Thus, we arrive that at the optimum quantities: qa = qb = qc =

7
 with respective profits i =
2
14
 for all 
cartel members i ∈ N.
3 = { {a}, {b, c} }: Last, we consider a market configuration with a two-firm cartel. There are 
three possible cartels consisting of two firms, {a, b}, {a, c}, and {b, c}. Given the symmetry of firms, 
however, payoffs for cartel members and the outsider firm do not depend on the identity of the firms 
in the cartel. We therefore present here only the case when firms b and c operate in a cartel and firm 
a behaves competitively.
 5We acknowledge that a comprehensive analysis of the single market for a finite number of firms with linear demand and 
quadratic costs has been conducted by Amir and Stepanova (2009). Our set up of market demand and firm cost function are a 
special case of those considered by Amir and Stepanova (2009) with the value of their model parameters being b = 1, c = 0, 
and d = 1
2
.
 6We use the simplified notation  = 
1




































−3qi−2qj−2qk = 0 for all i, j, k∈{1, 2, 3} with i≠ j≠ k.
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The profit maximization problem of the cartel members is given by: 
The two first-order conditions of the cartel optimization problem are: 




The optimization problem of firm a which is outside of the cartel is given by (4) with the reaction 
function given by (5). Using these reaction functions, we arrive at the optimal quantity for the non-co-
operating firm a being qa =
3
13
 and for the cartel firms being qb = qc =
2
13
. Thus, the cartel members 
earn b = c =
102
169




We now turn to the analysis of the stability properties of each market configuration:








2. However, 𝜋a(𝜔2) < 𝜋a(𝜔3) =
27𝛼2
338
, which shows the instability of the monopolistic cartel.
3. Finally, note that 𝜋b(𝜔3) = 𝜋c(𝜔3) =
10𝛼2
169
< 𝜋b(𝜔1) = 𝜋c(𝜔1) =
3a2
50
. This shows that a cartel of 
two firms in a single market is unstable as well.
We conclude that in each of the three possible market configurations of a single market there is a 
deviating coalition: The grand coalition provides deviating possibility in the absence of cartel; any one 
firm will deviate from the grand coalition with the other two firms in a cartel; and any firm member of 
a two-firm cartel deviates to be a singleton. This implies that there indeed does not exist a core stable 
market configuration in a single market with three firms.
3.2 | Core stability in two markets
Consider the specific case where m = 2 with  = {M1, M2}. Furthermore, we recall that 𝛼1 < 𝛼2. 
Even in this simplified setting, there emerge a relatively large number of non-trivial cartel formation 
scenarios regarding the degree of cooperation and its market location. Exploiting the homogeneity of 
firms, we note that agreements are distinguishable along two dimensions—the size of the cooperating 
group and the market on which cooperation occurs. In the case of two markets and three firms consid-
ered here, we arrive at 64 possible market configurations.
Consider a bijection ϕ:{a, b, c}→N. Using ϕ, we identify three fundamentally different market 
structure types: ω = { {a},{b},{c} } denotes a market structure where all firms compete in quantity, 
i.e. no cartel is formed; ω = { {ϕ(a) ϕ(b)},{ϕ(c)} } denotes a market structure where exactly two 
firms—denoted as ϕ(a) and ϕ(b)—form a cartel and the cartel competes with the third, remaining 
firm (which we call a singleton) á la Cournot; and, ω = {N} = { {a, b, c} } denotes the case where all 
market participants form a single, monopolistic cartel.
Combining these possible market structures, we arrive at 10 exhaustive market configurations, 

























−3qi−2qj−qa = 0 for all i, j∈{b, c} with i≠ j.
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Alternatively, we can dispense with the symbolism ϕ and show directly how these ten market config-






{N} { {a, b},{c} } { {a, c},{b} } { {b, c},{a} } { {a}, {b}, {c} }
{N} 2 9 9 9 3
{ {a, b}, {c} } 10 7 8 8 5
{ {a, c}, {b} } 10 8 7 8 5
{ {b, c}, {a} } 10 8 8 7 5
{ {a}, {b}, {c} } 4 6 6 6 1
3.2.1 | Payoff schedules
An individual firm’s decision on whether to enter into a cartel agreement with other firms, where to 
locate the agreed cartel, and whether to leave a cartel is based solely on that firm’s profits. Before 
developing a complete analysis, we illustrate the computations involved by considering the particular 
market configuration discussed in Example 1.
Example 1 considers a market configuration that is denoted as 

6 = ⟨{ {a}, {b}, {c} },{ {a}, {b, c} }⟩ in the discussion above. In the series of profit maximization 
problems in Example 1 that describe how firms take their decisions in the context of market configu-
ration 6, result into a system of six first-order conditions that are relevant for this case. More specif-
ically, the optimization problem for firm a, which acts non-cooperatively on both markets, results in 
the following reaction functions: 


















5 {{ϕ(a), ϕ(b)}, {ϕ(c)}} { {a},{b},{c} }

6 { {a}, {b}, {c} } {{ϕ(a), ϕ(b)}, 
{ϕ(c)}}

7 {{ϕ(a), ϕ(b)}, {ϕ(c)}} {{ϕ(a), ϕ(b)}, 
{ϕ(c)}}

8 {{ϕ(a), ϕ(b)}, {ϕ(c)}} {{ϕ(a),ϕ(c)}, 
{ϕ(b)}}

9 {N} {{ϕ(a), ϕ(b)}, 
{ϕ(c)}}

10 {{ϕ(a), ϕ(b)}, {ϕ(c)}} {N}
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Similarly, the optimization problems that describe the decision making for firms b and c, respectively, on 
market M1 yield the following reaction functions for market M1: 
Last, the joint maximization problem that the cartel bc resolves on market M2 leads to the following 
first-order conditions: 
Solving the resulting system of six equations, we arrive at the following optimal quantity profiles: 
Clearly, firms b and c curtail their outputs at the optimum in the interest of their joint profits. This 
results into the following total firm profits: 
Similarly straightforward, though fairly tedious, computations result in the determination of all profits for 
cartel members and outsiders in each market configuration. These payoff schedules are collected in 
Table 2.7
In the table, the index n ∈ {1, …, 10}, n refers to the market configuration listed in Table 1. Some 
configurations accommodate multiple Cournot equilibria. Here, in the interest of comparability across 
configurations and following the adopted convention in the literature, we focus on symmetric equilib-
ria only. This leads to a unique payoff for each player in the game for each configuration. Due to the 
symmetry of the firms, we only make a distinction between the profits of cartel members and outsid-
ers. For the sake of clarity we use a subscript C to denote the profits of a cartel member and a subscript 



















































 7The supporting computations of the payoff schedules presented in Table 2 are available at https://sites.google.com/site/subha 
dipch akrab arti/cgl_paper3.
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one cartel; subscript O identifies a firm that is not a member of cartel in any market. Furthermore, we 
use superscripts to denote the location of the cartel in the reported equilibrium: superscripts 1 or 2, 
refer to cartels on markets M1 or M2, respectively (but not the other), while superscript 1, 2 indicates 
that firm is a member of cartels on both markets.
3.2.2 | Core Stable configurations
In contrast to the single market case, in the two-market setting a stable cartel agreement exists pro-
vided that markets are sufficiently similar in size.8 Interestingly, that core stable agreement is unique 
and hinges upon the existence of cartels with the same membership in both markets. Intuitively, our 
result is achieved without the need to rely on punishment strategies, entry deterrence, or intertemporal 
considerations discussed in the literature. Below we present formally our main result.
Proposition 1 For 379
523
𝛼2 < 𝛼1 < 𝛼2 there exists a unique core stable market configuration given by 
Sketch of a Proof  Assuming 379
523
𝛼2 < 𝛼1 < 𝛼2 we determine exactly the incentivized transitions that 
coalitions can establish between the different structures in the two markets. Using tedious com-





 can be determined that are 
feasible—stated as condition (i) in Definition 2—as well as incentivized—stated as condition 




, the result of the non-existence of 
core stable market configuration is reinstated.

∗ =7 = ⟨{ {(a),(b)} , {(c)} } , { {(a),(b)} , {(c)} }⟩ .
T A B L E  2  Equilibrium profits in each configuration
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(ii) in Definition 2. These incentivized transitions are collected and represented in the transition 
graph in Figure 1. We will also adopt the short-hand notation i(n) to refer to profits of firm i 
in market configuration n ∈ {1, …, 10} which are listed in Table 2.
Hence, assuming 379
523
𝛼2 < 𝛼1 < 𝛼2, in the transition graph 
p−S⟶q for p, q ∈ {1,  2,  …,  10} 















) for every i ∈ S 
and 𝜋j (
q
) > 𝜋j (
p
) for at least one j ∈ S.
All other transitions are not depicted in the graph in Figure 1. Hence, all transitions that are not 
represented in Figure 1 are either not feasible, or are feasible, but not incentivized.
From the incentivized transitions depicted in Figure 1, it is clear that configuration 7 represents a 
sink in this graph. This means that 7 is indeed a core stable configuration.
Moreover, from the observation that any alternative configuration p, p ≠ 7, is connected to 7 
through a directed path of incentivized transitions in the graph and that there are no cycles or loops in 
this graph, it follows that 7 is actually the unique core stable configuration.
This completes the sketch of the proof of the assertion of the proposition. ■
3.3 | Discussion: One market versus two markets
We would like to provide some intuition for our results, and, in particular we will focus our discussion 
on the role of convexity. The reason we do not get a core stable market configuration in the one market 
case is because of two mechanisms. Merger paradox refers to the situation where partial cooperation 
makes the cooperators worse off compared to no cooperation (i.e. fully competitive environment). 
The free rider problem refers to the situation in which cooperators under full cooperation are worse off 
compared to non-cooperators under partial cooperation. The first results in a deviating singleton for a 
two-firm cartel. The second results in a deviating singleton for the grand coalition.
With two markets, these effects do not disappear but are weakened. The merger paradox and the 
free rider problem both hold unambiguously only in market configuration 9: In Figure 1, the merger 
paradox is captured by the transition from 9 to 3 while the free rider problem drives the transition 
F I G U R E  1  Incentivised transitions for (379/523)α2 < α1 < α2
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from 9 to 7. Similarly, we can attribute to either the merger paradox or free rider problems all tran-
sitions depicted in Figure 1.
Recall that we stated in the introduction that convexity of the cost function has received some 
attention in the literature. The reason is that this property of the production technology may be em-
ployed to weaken the merger paradox. Consider a general quadratic cost function given by 
Note that for our analysis thus far we have used  = 1
2
. Consider the range of values of γ for which a car-
tel member in a two firm cartel successfully deviates and forms a singleton (merger paradox) in a single 
market interaction (i.e. for m = 1). Contrast that with the range of values of γ for which the same situation 
occurs in a two-market setting (i.e. m = 2). From our analysis so far, we know that if 379
523




 belongs to the former range but not the latter: as there is no core stable cartel in the single market 
case whereas 7 is a core stable market configuration for the cartel for the two-market case. In fact, one 
can show that the latter range is a strict subset of the former range.
Assume that 1 = 100 and 2 = 125. These parameter values satisfy the inequality in our propo-
sition. One can show that in the one market case (m = 1), there is successful deviation of the merger 
paradox type for 0 < γ < 0.801938.
Next, consider the market configuration 7 in the two market case (m = 2). There are three types of 
deviations possible. A member of the cartel can deviate in market M1 forming a singleton and resulting 
in market configuration 6. It can deviate in market M2 resulting in market configuration 
5. It can 
deviate in both markets resulting in market configuration 1. The range of γ for successful deviations 
in the first case is 0 < γ < 0.210087, in the second case is 0 < γ < 0.399714, and in the third case is 
0 < γ < 0.430677. The reduced range of γ in all three cases testifies to this weakening.
4 |  FURTHER REMARKS
The contribution of our work is to demonstrate that stable cooperation agreements may exist when 
firms interact in more than one market whereas under the same conditions in a single-market inter-
action there are no stable agreements. Notably, we identify a unique pattern of stable agreements: 
they are partial as opposed to involving all market participants; and they operate in both markets and 
among the same firms. The main mechanism underpinning our results is the weakening of the merger 
paradox, i.e. the incentives of a firm to break apart in a two-firm cartel.
Two important assumptions deserve some more attention. First, as pointed out in Section 2, the 
cooperative agreements studied here are localized in a specific market. That is in our model a cartel 
is operating on a single market with cartel members agreeing on the quantity quotas to that specific 
market. On the one hand, this assumption justifies our choice to focus on symmetric equilibria given 
that firms face the same technology and the same market conditions. Alternatively, a “global cartel” 
could be modelled as an agreement that commits firms to operate on some markets and not on others. 
Schröder (2007) analyse the stability of international cartels and demonstrate that the viability of such 
agreements rely on repeated interaction, the ability to punish non-compliant members of the cartel, 
and the size and form of transaction costs that link markets.
On the other hand, the focus on local agreements weakens concerns about enforcement and mon-







for some 𝛾 > 0.
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cartel members do not share their profits, i.e. payoffs are non-transferable. This assumption too fits 
well with our approach to focus on symmetric equilibria as by definition cartel members will be 
earning the same profits on the market where the cartel operates, hence, no firm member of a cartel 
earns higher payoffs than other members which the higher-profit firm can use to compensate any 
lower-profit member of the cartel and ensure their cooperation. We would argue that cooperative 
agreements that rely on self-administering of side payments are more prone to deviations—a firm 
may renege on giving out the side payment or a recipient of side payments may renege on the agreed 
strategy—as such agreements would need to rely on long-term repeated interactions.
Both assumptions—the local nature of the cartel and the non-transferability of payoffs—allow us 
to highlight that cooperative arrangements among firms in multimarket contact environments can be 
self-sustained under more general conditions and weak institutional settings than previously studied 
in the literature.
Opportunities for future work are manifold. As a first step one may generalize this model to an 
arbitrary number of firms and markets. The challenge of such a model—as discussed earlier—is in 
the increased complexity of possible cooperative agreements. In this more general context, concepts 
developed in network theory may be useful to render these more general models tractable.
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